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mAbstract
This study evaluates potential migration flows to the European Union from its
Eastern neighbors and Croatia. We perform out-of-sample forecasts to time series
cross-sectional data about post-enlargement migration flows following the EU’s 2004
enlargement. We consider two baseline policy scenarios, with and without accession
of sending countries to the EU. Our results show that migration flows are driven by
migration costs and economic conditions, but the largest effects accrue to policy
variables. In terms of the predicted flows: (i) we can expect modest migration flows
in the case of no liberalization of labor markets and only moderately increased
migration flows under liberalization; (ii) after an initial increase following liberalization,
migration flows will subside to a long run steady state; (iii) Ukraine will send the
most migrants; and (iv) the largest inflows in absolute terms are predicted for
Germany, Italy and Austria, whereas Ireland, Denmark, Finland and again Austria are
the main receiving countries relative to their population.
JEL codes: F22; C23; C53
Keywords: Migration; Free movement of workers; European union; Eastern
partnership; EU enlargement; Migration potential; Out-of-sample forecasting1. Introduction
The 2013 expansion of the European Union (EU) to include Croatia as its 28th Mem-
ber State marks the latest move in the process of the EU’s eastern enlargement1. EU
expansion is part of a broader process of intensified cooperation with the EU’s Eastern
neighbors. This includes countries that have already obtained candidate status, such as
Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia, as well as countries with which the EU initiated a
program of intensified cooperation called the Eastern Partnership (EaP) in 20092. The
EaP consists of six post-Soviet states, namely Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Azerbaijan,
Armenia and Georgia, as well as the EU, and is meant to provide an institutionalized
forum for the discussion of political and economic topics of joint relevance for all part-
ners. It aims at providing the groundwork for an Association Agreement between the
EU and the Eastern partners, which should eventually lead to the establishment of a
free-trade zone comprising the 27 EU Member States and the six Eastern partners. In
the long run, this might also result in the future membership of these countries.
The expansion of the European Union and the prospect of extending free mobility to
workers from the EU’s Eastern neighborhood pose the question of the expected scale
of its effect on east–west mobility. The size of the potential sending populations and2015 Fertig and Kahanec; licensee Springer. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
ttribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any
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cording to the IMF’s World Economic Outlook Database (September 2011), Macedonia,
Montenegro and Serbia have a total population of slightly more than 10 million, and the
six EaP partner countries exhibited a population of almost 76 million people in 2009 (i.e.,
around 18 per cent of the EU27 total), of which approximately 46 million live in Ukraine.
The average GDP per capita (pc) in purchasing-power-parities (PPP) in these countries
amounted to slightly more than 9,260 US-$ in the same year. However, there is quite a
large heterogeneity within this country group. At the lower end of the distribution,
Moldova displays a GDP pc in PPP of around 2,860 US-$, whereas Croatia forms the
upper end with around 17,800 US-$, followed by Belarus with slightly more than 12,700
US-$. For comparison, the average GDP pc in PPP of the EU in 2009 amounts to almost
29,700 US-$, and in the Euro-area, it amounts to more than 31,800 US-$. However, also
within the EU considerable heterogeneity hides behind these averages.
In the past, EU enlargements entailed controversial discussions with respect to the
potential consequences of extending the free movement of labor regulation to the new
Member States. This was especially the case in the context of the enlargements towards
Central and Eastern Europe in 2004 and 2007, respectively. Consequently, existing
Member States implemented different policies towards workers from the accession
countries (for a synoptic overview, see the European Commission (2008), p. 11).
Whereas the majority of EU-15-countries fully or partially restricted mobility for a
transitional period of some years, Ireland, Sweden and the UK allowed free access for
workers from countries of the 2004 enlargement round from the outset. By contrast,
only Finland and Sweden fully opened their labor markets for Bulgarian and Romanian
nationals. In particular, the enlargement towards the eight Central and Eastern European
countries (EU-8) in 2004 induced migratory movements from east to west, which from
some observers were characterized as being “spectacular” (Kaczmarczyk and Okolski
2008), with the different transitional arrangements displaying substantial effects on
observable flows.
Against this background, this paper aims at assessing potential migration flows to the
EU from the countries with which the EU is intensifying cooperation – recent entrant
Croatia, several candidate countries and members of the EaP program – by utilizing
the experiences of the enlargement wave of 2004. In essence, we venture to answer the
question of how much (additional) immigration should be expected if EaP countries were
allowed to enter the EU and if free movement of workers regulations were extended to
them. To this end, we use a well-established model to estimate the determinants of immi-
gration from the accession countries to the EU-15. This model allows for the distinguish-
ing between short- and long-term factors impinging upon observable migration flows.
The long-run coefficients are subsequently used to forecast the immigration potential
from EaP-countries under different policy scenarios or transitional arrangements. Since
this is a double extrapolation exercise – over time and across space – we have to invoke
some identification assumptions that must hold to ensure that the forecasts are valid.
Whereas the EaP-countries differ from the EU-8 countries in some aspects, the majority
of the EU-8 countries share a common history with the EaP-countries in that they are
rather young market economies which all underwent a deep economic and political
transformation process during the 1990s. Hence, there are reasons to believe that EaP-
countries are comparable to EU-8 countries in many social, economic and political
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riods: EU-8 before EU accession compares to EaP in the beginning of 2010s, and EU-8
after EU accession compares to EaP after hypothetical EU accession.
Our empirical results suggest that while economic and demographic variables matter,
migration flows are mainly driven by policy variables. From the policy perspective, our
key results are that the migration potential from the studied sending countries is mod-
est, the liberalization of migrants’ access to receiving labor markets increases migration
flows, albeit only temporarily, and Ukraine will remain the main source country,
whereas Germany, Italy and Austria are expected to receive most of these migrants in
absolute terms. Relative to the sending countries’ population in 2010, Ireland,
Denmark, Finland and again Austria are the main receiving countries,
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we provide some
stylized facts and a brief overview of the literature regarding migration within the EU.
Section 3 then describes the theoretical model together with its empirical specification
and the utilized data before estimation results are presented in section 4. In section 5,
we provide different forecasting scenarios, and section 6 concludes.2. Migration within the EU – stylized facts and review of literature
Despite the free movement of workers regulation, migration streams within the EU were
rather low between the 1980s and the beginning of the 2000s. Against the background of
rather large and persistent regional differentials in wages and employment prospects, one
might even argue that within-EU migration activities were too low during this period (see
Fertig, Michael and Christoph M. Schmidt 2002). Even the enlargements of the EU to-
wards Southern Europe (Greece in 1981 as well as Spain and Portugal in 1986) did not in-
duce any remarkable changes in observed migration flows (see, e.g., Bover and Pilar Velilla
2001). To illustrate this for the most recent past, Figure 1 provides intra-EU migration
flows for the EU-12 countries3 (without Greece, due to missing data).
From this figure, it becomes transparent that net-migration (i.e., inflows minus out-
flows) from other core Member States of the EU is negative for the case of Germany
throughout all years; that is, emigration of nationals from the EU-11 countries
exceeded immigration from these countries in every year. In all Member States, net-
migration was positive and varied between a few hundred and more than 40,000 per-
sons per year. However, it was less than 15,000 persons per year in the majority of
countries and years. This rather low net-immigration or – in the case of Germany, even
substantial net-emigration – stands in stark contrast to the persistent relative income
differentials (i.e., ratios of per-capita-incomes in purchasing power parities) between
the countries of the EU-12, as illustrated in Figure 2, which indicates that per-capita-
incomes in Germany, the Netherlands and UK are substantially and persistently higher
than in Portugal and Spain4. Furthermore, we do not even observe any convergence
between the considered country pairs. By contrast, the PCI-ratios start to increase after
2004, having been almost constant before. This is especially evident for the case of
Portugal. Against this background, the potential average returns of migration within
the EU seem to be high and increasing over time, although migration activities remain
constantly low. Hence, the (real or perceived) costs of moving to another European
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Figure 1 Net-Migration of EU-12 countries to selected Member States-1998-2010. Note: Nationals
from the EU-12 without Greece. Source: Eurostat database, May 2012; own calculations.
Fertig and Kahanec IZA Journal of Migration  (2015) 4:6 Page 4 of 27However, the enlargement of the EU-15 towards the eight Central and Eastern
European countries plus Cyprus and Malta in 2004, as well as the enlargement of
2007, induced (Bulgaria and Romania) induced considerable migratory movements from
east to west within the enlarged EU. In this context, the transitional arrangements with
respect to the free movement of labor regulation evidently displayed substantial effects on
observable migration flows. According to European Commission (2008, p. 115), the stock
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Figure 2 Ratio of per-capita-income in purchasing power parties for selected countries. Source:
World Economic Outlook database of the IMF, September 2011; own calculations.
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same observation holds for the 2007 accession countries of Bulgaria and Romania. Despite
entering the EU as recently as 2007, the number of residents from these two countries in
other EU-15 Member States increased from 691,000 in 2003 to 1,331,000 persons in 2006
and further to 1,617,000 people in 2007. Hence, the stock of Bulgarian and Romanian na-
tionals in the EU-15 almost doubled even prior to their EU-accession. Figure 3 illus-
trates this for the 2004 EU-8 accession countries from Central and Eastern Europe as well
as the EU-2 (Bulgaria and Romania) accession countries of 2007.
It becomes apparent from this figure that the stock of EU-8 nationals residing in the
EU-15 continuously increased from 1998 to 2008. However, the slope of this increase
became considerably steeper after their accession in 2004, with the stock of immigrants
from the EU-8 countries increasing by almost 23 percent from 2004 to 2005. The
growth rate one year later was slightly less than 32 percent, and between 2006 and
2007 it was around 25 percent. However, growth rates declined considerably after 2007,
which might be the result of the financial and economic crisis in Europe and/or an in-
dication for satiation. In contrast to the pattern for the EU-8 countries, the stock of
Bulgarian and Romanian nationals residing in one of the EU-15 Member States displays
a remarkable increase before 2007, with average annual growth rates of slightly less
than 25 percent. The post-accession development was very similar to this pattern, with
average annual growth rates of around 24 percent.
As already emphasized by Brücker et al. (2009), post-accession migratory movements
not only differ in size but also in their regional distribution with respect to the main
destination countries. Table 1 provides the shares of total net-inflows into the EU-15
for each Member State. This table clearly indicates that Germany, the UK and Spain
constituted the main destination countries for immigrants from the EU-8 in the pre-




































Figure 3 Stock of foreign residents from EU-8 and EU-2 in EU-15. Source: Holland et al. (2011); own
calculations.
Table 1 Regional distribution of net-inflows to EU-15 in percentages
Belgium Denmark Germany Ireland Greece
Net-migration from EU-8 between
1998 and 2003
3.5 0.8 29.5 6.1 5.4
Net-migration from EU-8 between
2004 and 2009
1.3 1.7 13.7 12.1 0.2
Net-migration from EU-2 between
1998 and 2006
1.0 0.1 −0.1 0.4 3.3
Net-migration from EU-2 between
2007 and 2009
1.9 0.7 6.3 0.7 6.0
Spain France Italy Luxembourg Netherlands
Net-migration from EU-8 between
1998 and 2003
13.3 0.6 7.2 0.2 1.4
Net-migration from EU-8 between
2004 and 2009
6.5 0.2 5.4 0.5 3.1
Net-migration from EU-2 between
1998 and 2006
57.8 3.6 28.3 0.0 0.3
Net-migration from EU-2 between
2007 and 2009
17.1 1.5 46.5 0.0 1.4
Austria Portugal Finland Sweden UK
Net-migration from EU-8 between
1998 and 2003
2.3 0.2 1.4 −0.4 28.5
Net-migration from EU-8 between
2004 and 2009
1.8 0.1 1.1 2.7 49.5
Net-migration from EU-2 between
1998 and 2006
0.8 1.3 0.0 −0.1 3.3
Net-migration from EU-2 between
2007 and 2009
4.9 2.6 0.1 0.8 9.5
Source: Holland et al. (2011); own calculations.
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period, whereas Spain was replaced by Ireland. However, this picture is considerably
different for the EU-2 countries, as the main destinations for nationals from Bulgaria
and Romania used to be Spain and Italy prior to accession, and Italy and Spain there-
after. However, a few EU-15 Member States experienced a substantial increase in net-
immigration from these accession countries, with Germany, Austria and the UK
displaying the highest rates of increase.
From the sending countries’ perspective, Poland, Bulgaria and Romania experienced
the largest net-outflow of inhabitants in the direction of the EU-15. In 2009, almost 1.5
million Polish citizens resided in one of the EU-15 Member States, whereas the corre-
sponding numbers for Bulgaria and Romania are slightly less than 0.5 million and more
than two million individuals, respectively. However, Poland and Romania are also the
two countries with the largest populations, with Bulgaria ranked fifth, following the
Czech Republic and Hungary. Hence, it is unsurprising that a large number of Polish
and Romanian nationals live outside their countries. Consequently, it seems to be more
sensible to consider the relative outflows – with Figure 4 providing the population
share of EU-8- and EU-2-nationals living in one of the EU-15 Member States – thus
accounting for the population size in the sending country. The figure indicates that Ro-
manian citizens display the largest group of non-national residents in the EU-15 among
the accession countries in relative terms. However, and in contrast to absolute num-

















































































































Figure 4 Population share of EU-8 and EU-2 nationals residing in EU-15 countries. Source: Holland
et al. (2011); own calculations.
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Pytliková and Zimmermann (2015) show that migration flows in an enlarging European
Union indeed responded positively to EU enlargement and labor market opening. They
also evaluate the effects of economic shocks, arguing that whereas the adverse eco-
nomic situation in source countries was one of the primary push-factors, short-term
fluctuations in the sending countries did not prove to be significant. However, short-
term variation in destination countries’ GDP per capita and unemployment rates af-
fected mobility patterns significantly in the expected directions, with weaker economies
attracting fewer migrants. This indicates responsiveness of migration flows to the Great
Recession.
The literature offers some tentative conclusions regarding the economic conse-
quences of these migration flows. Kahanec (2013b) scrutinizes the experiences of the
two enlargement waves by assessing actual migration flows and reviewing their effects
on the labor markets of receiving and sending countries. The author concludes that the
available evidence does not indicate negative effects on the receiving countries’ labor
markets or welfare systems. However, sending countries run the risk of skill shortages
in certain occupations or sectors, as well as instability of public finances. On the other
hand, Elsner (2013a, 2013b) identifies positive effects of out-migration on wages in
Lithuania; additionally, outmigration might uncover potential benefits through brain
circulation.
Hazans and Kaia Philips (2010) use labor force survey data for the period 2002 to
2007 and several other surveys to compare the profile of Baltic temporary workers
abroad before and after EU accession with that of stayers and return migrants. The au-
thors find significant changes in how ethnicity and citizenship affect workers’ mobility.
According to the authors’ results, in the first two years after 2004, 11 to 13 percent of
migrants from Lithuania and Estonia and 15 percent of their Latvian counterparts were
Fertig and Kahanec IZA Journal of Migration  (2015) 4:6 Page 8 of 27unemployed in the home country in the previous year, while around 7 percent were ei-
ther students or pupils. These proportions exceed those observed among stayers by a
factor of three to four, indicating that work abroad has represented an important cop-
ing strategy for the Baltic unemployed or potentially unemployed. Furthermore, Hazans
and Kaia Philips (2010) point out that the two-thirds to three-quarters of all migrants
had secondary education and that enlargement changed the skill composition of mi-
grants. In the years prior to 2004, Lithuanian migrants had the same skill distribution
as stayers, while Latvian and Estonian migrants were on average more educated than
stayers. Post-accession migrants from all three countries were significantly less edu-
cated than stayers, with this gap tending to increase over time.
Dustmann and Tommaso Frattini (2011) point out that different historical and eco-
nomic developments resulted in different immigration experiences from different coun-
tries of origin. While some European countries have been immigration countries since
the 1960s, others emerged as immigration countries around two decades ago. Conse-
quently, European countries presently exhibit very dissimilar immigrant populations
with respect to the country of origin, ethnicity and education. Labor market integration
of immigrants remains a key policy challenge in Europe, as migrants face significant
barriers impeding their access to the labor market or social welfare provisions (Constant
et al. 2009; Kahanec et al. 2013a). Human capital gaps are another limiting factor, with
some migrant populations exhibiting educational attainment comparable or even exceed-
ing that of the natives, while others are lagging behind (Dustmann and Tommaso Frattini
2011; Kahanec 2013a). Danzer and Dietz (2014) document that immigrant populations
from EaP countries have higher educational attainments than natives in the EU and that
some seem to attempt to preempt the risk of downskilling by taking training courses
before departure. While downskilling into jobs below one’s educational attainment is a
widespread problem, temporary migrants tend to compensate for this disadvantage by
working longer hours (Kahanec and Shields 2013).
Kahanec and Zimmermann (2010) provide an encompassing account of the early
post-accession period, highlighting: (i) the positive role of east–west mobility for alloca-
tive efficiency of EU labor markets; (ii) the lack of evidence on negative labor market
effects of migration; and (iii) potential benefits, as well as some policy challenges, of
brain circulation for the sending countries5.
With respect to the driving forces behind observable international migration flows,
the literature suggests a variety of explanations depending on the sample of countries
and the time period analyzed. Kim and Cohen (2010) investigate the determinants of
international migration flows into 17 Western countries from 230 origin countries dur-
ing a period ranging from 1950 to 2007. To this end, they regress the logarithm of the
number of migrants on a set of demographic, geographic and social explanatory vari-
ables. The authors find that demographic and geographic factors are the most import-
ant driving forces behind observable inflows. Specifically, the population of origin and
destination country, the infant mortality rate of origin and destination, the distance be-
tween capitals and the land area of the destination display a significant and substantial
impact on immigration activities. Furthermore, a young age structure in the destination
was associated with lower inflows, while a young age structure in the origin was associ-
ated with higher inflows. By contrast, social and historical determinants proved to be
less important. While Borjas (1999), in his seminal article, found some welfare magnet
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net effects in international or European contexts (DeGiorgi and Pellizzari 2009;
Pedersen et al. 1990; Giulietti et al. 2013).
A number of studies looking at EaP-migrants in the EU from a policy perspective
have appeared recently. Clark and Drinkwater (2014) report that flows from EaP-
countries to the UK declined following changes of UK immigration policies. Those
remaining in the UK are in many aspects similar to EU-8 migrants, including their rela-
tively high educational attainment, but exhibit lower employment rates and higher oc-
cupational status (although not as high as for migrants from the old member states).
Biavaschi and Zimmermann (2014), in a study on Germany, document relatively worse
labor market outcomes of EaP-migrants vis-à-vis other migrant groups but argue that
they possess skills that will be demanded in the German labor market. Marchetti et al.
(2014) discuss the Italian experience focusing on migrants from the two EaP-countries
that send most migrants to Italy: Moldova and Ukraine. The authors argue that distinct
patterns have emerged for both source countries; whereas Ukrainian migrants are
mostly mature women with temporary migration plans, Moldovan migrants are youn-
ger and with a higher proportion of males, tend to have permanent intentions, and
come for family reunification. Farré and Rodríguez-Planas (2014) find that the employ-
ment rate of EaP-migrants (mainly Ukrainians) in Spain is similar to that of the natives,
mainly because of their higher educational attainment and a quick adjustment that off-
sets the effects of an employment penalty they face upon arrival. In a similar vein,
Duszczyk and Paweł Kaczmarczyk (2013) document the prevalence of women, young,
and well educated workers from Ukraine among EaP-migrants in Poland, indicating
that their skills tend to complement those of the native labor force. There is little evi-
dence available about migrants from Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, or Serbia separ-
ately in (the rest of ) the EU, but several studies document labor market segmentation
between natives and immigrants from the former Yugoslavia in the EU (e.g., Constant and
Massey 2005).
Concerning the determinants of migration, Danzer and Dietz (2014) look at the de-
terminants of temporary out-migration from Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and
Ukraine in 2006. They find that the incidence of migration to the EU was lower for the
less educated and previously unemployed, but higher for those who invested in their
human capital prior to departure (including language skills) or were older. Several pa-
pers attempt to predict the migration potential of the accession candidates of the previ-
ous enlargement rounds (see, e.g., Bauer, Thomas and Klaus F. Zimmermann 1999;
Fertig 2001; Fertig and Schmidt 2001; and Orlowski et al. 2000), with the majority of
them deriving a rather modest forecast. Zaiceva (2006) provides an encompassing over-
view of the literature on migration projections with respect to EU-enlargement. To the
best of our knowledge, to date there is no study that systematically predicts migration
flows from EU’s Eastern neighbors or Croatia to (the rest of ) the EU.3. Theoretical model, empirical specification and data
In order to estimate the structural relationship between migration flows and its determi-
nants, we use an adaption of the model of Hatton (1995) to time series cross-sectional
data (for a detailed description, see Fertig (2001). The theoretical model is formulated in
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vestment in human capital (Sjaastad 1962). Hence, the individual migration probability
depends on the difference in expected utility streams in the country of origin and the des-
tination country minus the costs of migration. Utility streams are assumed to depend on
expected income, which is the product of the wage rate and employment probability in
each country.
In forming their expectations on utility streams, the model assumes that migrants as-
sign the greatest weight to the most recent past, with this weight declining with time.
Thus, the migration decision not only depends on the current difference in utility
streams but also on all expected future values. This implies that although the current
difference might be negative for some migrants, the net present value of migration
might become positive if they were to wait for an additional year.
Furthermore, the model assumes that the employment rates in the destination coun-
tries follow a binomial distribution. Hence, the model explicitly accounts for uncer-
tainty in employment prospects, which leads to their greater weight in the destination
countries than in the risk-neutral Harris-Todaro model. Finally, in order to estimate
the model using aggregate-level migration data, the individual probability concept is
approximated by the aggregate migration rate. This implies the assumption that aggre-
gate migration rates reflect the average migration probabilities of all individuals in a
specific country of origin.
Putting these pieces together yields the following reduced-form estimation equation
of the model (for more details see Hatton 1995; Fertig 2001; and Hatton 2005)
ΔMh→dt ¼ εh þ ε1Δ ln wd=wh
 
t




þ ε5 ln edð Þt−1 þ ε6 ln ehð Þt−1
ε7M
h→d
t−1 þ ε8MSTh→dt−1 þ ε9POPht−1 þ ε10POPdt−1
In this equation, M denotes the migration rate from the country of origin h to the
destination country d in year t. The wage rate is denoted by w and employment rates
by e. Thus, changes and levels of the economic variables enter the equation separately,
providing the possibility to distinguish between short- and long-run determinants of
migration flows. Furthermore, the above specification is an extension of the single-
destination model in Fertig (2001) to several destination countries. Hence, the model is
augmented by the relative wage rate of each single destination country to the rest of
the EU-15. This extension should capture the attractiveness of d relative to that of
other EU-countries, while the same holds for employment rates.
The stock of migrants (MST) and the population shares of individuals aged 20–40 liv-
ing in h and d, respectively, enter the equation via migration costs. The model also con-
tains country of origin-specific intercepts ɛh, which also enter the equation via the
modeling of migration costs. Hence, migration costs are, on the one hand, approxi-
mated by the stock of migrants from h living in country d, which, from a theoretical
perspective, captures network and potential crowding effects. On the other hand, mi-
gration costs are meant to be captured by the population shares of individuals aged
20–40 (POP) living in h and d, as well as a sending country-specific term. The latter ac-
counts for country-specific relocation costs (e.g., due to distance) together with
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sending country-specific migration cost). The population share of individuals aged 20–
40 living in h should capture the population group that is typically the least bound to
the country due to family ties, and it also similarly exhibits the highest proficiency in foreign
languages as well as the highest expected returns to migration due to a relatively long
potential working time in the destination country’s labor market. The population share
of individuals aged 20–40 living in d approximates the need for immigrants due to
demographic factors in the destination country, thus capturing the “openness” of
country d towards immigrants or its “willingness to welcome” them simply because
they are needed.
Finally, we extent the model by two sets of dummy variables covering policy regimes.
The first equals one for all years in which country d allowed workers of country h free
access to its labor market, and zero otherwise. The second dummy equals one for all
years in which country d partially restricted the access of workers from country h to its
labor market, and zero otherwise. Hence, full restriction forms the reference category
(see Table A.1 in the appendix for a detailed description of these policy dummies).
The model is estimated by OLS with panel-corrected standard errors using time-
series cross-section data for migration from the EU-8 to the EU-15 (for details, see
below), following Beck and Katz (1995). The authors demonstrate that this estimation
method maintains the advantage of OLS parameter estimates that perform very well in
the context of time-series cross-section data and simultaneously avoid the production
of inaccurate standard errors, like the OLS- or frequently used FGLS-estimator. Finally,
by setting all Δ’s to zero and solving for M, one can derive the long-run steady state re-
lationship for net migration rates. The calculated long-run coefficients are used for the
simulations of the expected magnitude of immigration from Croatia and the EaP-
countries to the EU-15 under different policy scenarios.
We apply the model to data for migration from the EU-8 to the EU-15 without
Luxembourg (EU-14 in what follows) for the period 1999–2009. Within the EU-15,
Luxembourg is by far the smallest (in terms of population) and simultaneously also
the richest country. Therefore, in order to avoid biased estimation results for the per-
capita-income variable, Luxembourg was excluded from the sample of destination
countries6. Net-immigration to the EU-14 is calculated as the change in the stock of
foreign residents from h in d between t and t-1. The stock of nationals is taken from
Holland et al. (2011), while the explanatory variables stem from the IMF’s World Eco-
nomic Outlook Database (GDP p.c. in PPP) and the statistics database of Eurostat
(unemployment and population). The estimation results are summarized in the fol-
lowing section.4. Estimation results
Table 2 contains the estimation results for three different specifications of our model.
In the first specification, we model policy regimes by including the two dummy vari-
ables indicating free movement of labor and partial restrictions7. In the second specifi-
cation, we disentangle the free movement dummy by including a separate dummy
variable for each year of free movement. This specification is meant to investigate
whether the impact of free movement is higher in the first years of opening up borders,
Table 2 Estimation results
Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification 3
Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value
Czech Republica 0.0086142 0.94 0.0137581 1.61 0.0363270 3.37**
Estoniaa 0.0195203 1.63 0.0207826 1.68* 0.0170489 1.13
Hungarya 0.0058682 0.66 0.0099457 1.11 0.0275268 2.81**
Latviaa 0.0136640 1.58 0.0136286 1.50 −0.0032966 −0.31
Lithuaniaa 0.0298836 2.61** 0.0304373 2.54** 0.0058955 0.39
Slovak Republica 0.0120985 1.19 0.0130839 1.27 0.0101911 0.62
Sloveniaa 0.0121251 1.17 0.0173840 1.74* 0.0415625 3.23**
Czech Republic after accession - - - - 0.0000516 0.00
Estonia after accession - - - - 0.0334383 1.65*
Hungary after accession - - - - 0.0065572 0.57
Latvia after accession - - - - 0.0456591 2.65**
Lithuania after accession - - - - 0.0538456 2.18**
Slovak Republic after accession - - - - 0.0098218 0.68
Slovenia after accession - - - - 0.0034885 0.19
Lagged net migration rate −0.8621185 −4.14** −0.8742497 −4.12** −0.8961853 −4.21**
Free movementb 0.0255262 3.24** - - - -
First year of free movement - - 0.0093630 0.83 0.0060164 0.58
Second year of free movement - - 0.0279214 2.44** 0.0271822 2.56**
Third year of free movement - - 0.0367123 2.84** 0.0389501 3.13**
Fourth year of free movement - - 0.0411250 2.96** 0.0467449 3.47**
Fifth year of free movement - - 0.0288150 1.08 0.0326838 1.30
Sixth year of free movement - - 0.0257276 1.10 0.0328991 1.50
Post accession - - - - −0.0089389 −0.63
Partial restrictions dummyb 0.0046229 0.88 0.0057199 1.23 0.0038009 0.69
(Log) Lagged PCI-ratio (in PPP)
destination to home country
0.0175044 1.67* 0.0197802 1.91* 0.0313120 2.90**
(Log) Lagged employment rate
home country
−0.0497116 −0.58 −0.0892714 −1.07 −0.2786510 −3.11**
(Log) Lagged employment rate
destination country
0.0839770* 1.72* 0.0782003 1.62 0.0593511 1.36
(Log) Lagged share of 20–39 years
old in destination country
0.1121061 1.32 0.1124977 1.34 0.1133294 1.32
(Log) Lagged share of 20–39 years
old in home country
0.0096709 0.03 −0.0434662 −0.15 −0.0674844 −0.12
Delta of (log) PCI-ratio (in PPP)
destination to home country
0.1014673 1.3 0.0602686 0.71 0.0743435 0.94
Delta of (log) employment rate
home country
0.2344753 1.27 0.2308804 1.26 0.4156827** 2.08**
Delta of (log) employment rate
destination country
−0.0339566 −0.19 0.0634800 0.37 0.1889106 1.17
Lagged stock of migrants from
home in destination country
0.0000002** 1.98** 0.0000002** 2.12** 0.0000002** 2.29**
Constant −0.2105243 −0.51 0.0030846 0.01 0.9299053** 2.24**
Number of observations 1,204 1,204 1,204
R-squared 0.361 0.368 0.380
(Wald test for) common intercept Rejected Rejected Rejected
Reference categories: aPoland; bfull restriction. **Significant at 5 per cent-level, *at 10 per cent-level.
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sending country-specific migration costs might depend on the policy regime. On the one
hand, accession to the EU might open up completely new opportunities with respect to
leaving the country, thus reducing migration costs. On the other hand, living in an EU
Member State might also advance economic prospects at home due to higher economic in-
tegration, hence increasing migration costs. In order to account for this, we add a dummy
variable for the post accession period and interact it with the sending country-dummies.
In general, our estimation results suggest that economic conditions in the destination
countries play an important role in explaining observable migration flows. Both the
PCI-ratio between the destination and sending countries as well as employment rates
in the EU-8 exhibit a significant impact on net-migration. The higher the PCI-ratio, the
higher the observable flows, all other things being equal. The opposite holds for the
employment rate in the origin countries. By contrast, the employment rate in the EU-
14 seems to be of minor importance. Hence, our results suggest that migrants’ income
opportunities in the destination country compared to the home country have a systematic
impact on their decision to leave the country.
However, estimation results also clearly indicate that the costs of migration are im-
portant. The stock of migrants in the destination country exhibits a statistically signifi-
cant positive impact on net-migration, which suggests that existing migrant networks
in the destination countries help to attract further immigrants. Furthermore, the set of
sending country-specific intercepts suggest that migration costs vary by country and
react to policy. The results of specification 3 suggest that country-specific migration
costs exhibit a largely different pattern before and after the accession of the EU-8
countries. Prior to accession, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovenia display signifi-
cantly and substantially higher migration rates to the EU-14 than Poland, whereas those
of all other sending countries do not differ systematically from Poland. However, after
accession, we observe significantly higher migration rates (i.e., lower country-specific
migration costs) for the Baltic States only, even after controlling for economic condi-
tions and policy regimes. Thus, our results indicate that due to accession, country-
specific migration costs increased in all EU-8 countries compared to Poland, except the
Baltic States. For the latter, we observe a decrease. This finding suggests that for the
accession countries outside the Baltic region, accession to the EU seems to have opened
up new opportunities at home (e.g., due to economic integration into a large single
market) and hence increased migration costs. Finally, the mean of post-accession
country-specific intercepts is around 25 percent higher in specification 3 than in speci-
fication 2, in which we do not distinguish between policy regimes.
However, the largest single impact on observable flows is observed for policy indica-
tors. Hence, policy regimes matter more than migration costs and economic conditions.
Whereas partial liberalization does not have a significant effect on net-migration, the
number of years of free movement creates a significant and quantitatively substantial
impact on observable flows. One important result is that this impact follows an in-
versely u-shaped pattern, i.e., immigration increases in the first years after completely
opening up labor markets, reaches its maximum in year four and declines thereafter.
Thus, labor market liberalization evidently provides an incentive for nationals of the ac-
cession states to leave the country. This incentive is, however, countervailed by increas-
ing migration costs, at least for some countries (see above).
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ter. The estimated coefficients of the changes in economic indicators are all statistically
insignificant, apart from that of the employment rate in the destination countries8. Fi-
nally, the significant negative impact of the lagged net-migration rate suggests that im-
migration to the EU-14 varies around a stable level. Thus, there is no reason to expect
immigration to the EU to be ever-increasing in the future.
Naturally, our coefficient estimates are a weighted average of two regimes, namely
the migration regime prior to 2004 and thereafter. Table 3 contains separate estimates
for both time periods using specification 2 from above (apart from the accession
dummy). From this table, it becomes apparent that economic conditions in the “closed
border” regime only matter for short-term fluctuations, but not in the long-run. By
contrast, the stock of migrants still has a positive impact (probably due to family reuni-
fication, facilitation of access to the labor market and institutions, or similar reasons).
The observation that there was nontrivial immigration from the EU-8 in the years priorTable 3 Estimation results for pre- and post-enlargement periods
Pre-accession Post-accession
1999-2003 2004-2009
Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value
Czech Republica 0.00956270 1.48 0.0748285 3.59**
Estoniaa 0.00202300 0.49 0.1169072 3.78**
Hungarya 0.00240400 0.69 0.0893779 3.57**
Latviaa −0.00202470 −0.65 0.0994209 4.09**
Lithuaniaa 0.00700920 1.22 0.1203604 4.20**
Slovak Republica 0.00951000 1.76* 0.0058181 0.35
Sloveniaa 0.00810530 1.13 0.1084566 3.93**
Lagged net migration rate −0.71747930 −2.00** −0.9337470 −3.45**
First year of free movement - - 0.0036164 0.34
Second year of free movement - - 0.0255531 2.34**
Third year of free movement - - 0.0394101 2.91**
Fourth year of free movement - - 0.0525865 3.54**
Fifth year of free movement - - 0.0313255 1.13
Sixth year of free movement - - 0.0366845 1.61
Partial restrictions dummyb - - 0.0039100 0.69
(Log) Lagged PCI-ratio (in PPP) destination to home country 0.00468010 0.94 0.0357357 2.14**
(Log) Lagged employment rate home country −0.05107300 −1.41 −0.6126742 −4.35**
(Log) Lagged employment rate destination country −0.02096600 −0.82 0.2826819 3.08**
(Log) Lagged share of 20–39 years old in destination country 0.00796270 0.29 0.1834743 1.45
(Log) Lagged share of 20–39 years old in home country −0.15627340 −0.53 1.4724600** 2.34**
Delta of (log) PCI-ratio (in PPP) destination to home country −0.06489400 −3.04** 0.0640776 0.55
Delta of (log) employment rate home country 0.05323860 1.16 0.7292919* 1.84*
Delta of (log) employment rate destination country 0.01811520 0.39 0.4352930 1.47
Lagged stock of migrants from home in destination country 0.00000007 2.32** 0.0000003** 1.94**
Constant 0.36201190 1.57 0.8908057 1.45
Number of observations 532 672
R-squared 0.291 0.398
Reference category: aPoland; bfull restriction. **Significant at 5 per cent-level, *at 10 per cent-level.
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even in the closed border regime that applies to the countries under scrutiny.
Given that our model allows for distinguishing between short- and long-term factors
impinging upon observable migration flows, we have to calculate the long-run coefficients
for the final specifications, i.e., specification 3 in Table 2, as well as the pre-accession
specification in Table 3. This is achieved in a straightforward manner by setting all Δs in
equation (1) to zero so that the impact of short-run fluctuations is eliminated. These
long-run coefficients are then used to forecast the immigration potential from EaP-
countries for which no common migration history with the EU is available under different
policy scenarios or transitional arrangements. The results of these forecasts are presented
in the next section.5. Forecasting scenarios
Neither Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia or the EaP-countries share a com-
mon migration history under different policy scenarios or transitional arrangements
with the EU9. Thus, forecasts of expected immigration from these countries are a
double extrapolation exercise – over time and across space. This implies that we have
to invoke a couple of identification assumptions that must hold a priori to ensure that
the forecasts are valid. Clearly the most important assumption is the stability and trans-
ferability of the estimated structural relationship between observable flows and its de-
terminants. Hence, we have to assume that the structure that quite accurately describes
the relationship between migration from the EU-8 and the EU-14 remains stable over
the forecasting horizon and holds for the behavior of future migration from the EaP-
countries. This implies that the migration decision of individuals from the EaP-
countries must be determined by the same factors as the decision of individuals in our
sample countries, at least in the long-run. In addition, we need further assumptions for
the development of the exogenous variables in our model (i.e., GDP, employment and
population). Finally, we have to invoke an assumption for country-specific migration
costs. Clearly, the longer the forecasting period, the more likely that these assumptions
are violated.
Specifically, we present the results of two scenarios. The pre-accession scenario de-
scribes the status quo situation for all the studied countries (except Croatia, which is
already in the EU), and the projections thus produce migration flows that can be ex-
pected if there is no policy change10. Next, the accession scenario assumes accession
and selective liberalization of EU labor markets (i.e., partial restrictions) until 2014 and
full liberalization/free access from 2015 onwards.
 Pre-accession scenario: Long-run coefficients derived from the estimation results in
the left part of Table 3, using medium migration costs (i.e., the mean of the sending
country-specific intercepts).
 Accession scenario: Long-run coefficients derived from specification 3 of Table 2,
using low, medium and high sending country-specific migration costs for the time
after accession. Low country-specific migration costs are captured by the highest
value of the country intercepts, medium migration costs by the mean of all country
fixed-effects and high migration costs by the lowest value of the country dummies.
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exogenous variables in the destination countries (EU-14) are invoked:
 2010–2014: European recession, i.e., 0 percent growth of per per-capita incomes to-
gether with annual employment growth rates of −0.3 percent for high employment
countries, −0.1 percent for the medium group and 0.2 percent for the low employment
group11.
 2015–2020: EU recovery, i.e., 2 percent annual growth rate of per-capita-incomes
together with annual employment growth of 0.15 percent for high employment
countries, 0.3 percent for the medium group and 0.6 percent for the low group.
For the sending countries, we took the 2010 population data from the Eurostat popu-
lation statistics. We assume annual growth rates for per-capita-income presented in
Table 4. These growth rate forecasts are based on the IMF World Economic Outlook
database and were validated for the EaP countries within the project “Costs and Bene-
fits of Labour Mobility between the EU and the Eastern Partnership Partner Countries,”
drawing on the expertise of a network of national experts (Kahanec et al. 2013b). The
employment rate forecasts, calculated as 100 – unemployment rate (in %), were also
taken from the IMF World Economic Outlook database covering the period up to and
including 2017. For the remaining three years (up to and including 2020), employment
rates were extrapolated assuming a constant rate of change, calculated as the per
annum rate of change from 2012 to 2017. Employment rates were consulted with na-
tional experts from the project consortium and, in the case of Belarus, adjusted to bet-
ter reflect reality (Kahanec et al. 2013a)12. Finally, Libanova (2006) provides population
forecasts by age group for Ukraine. Population growth rates from Libanova (2006) were
then used for the other EU’s Eastern neighbors (as well as Croatia), as they, in our view
and the view of national experts, better reflect the sharply declining fertility rates in the
region than the forecasts provided by the United Nations’ World Population Prospects.
With respect to the migration forecasts for the EaP-countries, we concentrate on the
presentation of results for Ukraine since it is the most important country of this group
in quantitative terms. Migration projections for Ukraine are even more interesting
given the so-called Euromajdan protests, which started in November 2013, and the pol-
itical turmoil following them, resulting in displacement of many people. Nevertheless,
all the scenarios regarding Ukraine presented in the following rest on the assumption
that the political situation is comparable to that in mid-2013. This is because we trustTable 4 Assumed annual growth of PCI (in per cent) in EaP-countries, Croatia,







Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Ukraine 3.5 4
Source: Kahanec et al. (2013).
Table 5 Predicted net-immigration from Croatia to EU-14 – Pre-accession scenario















United Kingdom 7,542 0.01
Total 119,072 0.03
cInflows relative to population in 2010 (in per cent).
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long-term migration potential. Also, our forecasts should be understood as pertaining
to the whole of Ukraine, in its internationally recognized borders. Surely, the violence
may result in a changed economic, social and political situation in Ukraine. Given the
unpredictable situation as of December 2014, we abstain from speculation on the exactTable 6 Predicted net-immigration from Ukraine to EU-14 – Pre-accession scenario















United Kingdom 50,450 0.08
Total 846,706 0.21
cInflows relative to population in 2010 (in per cent).
Table 7 Predicted net-immigration from Croatia – Accession scenario
Stock of Nationals from Croatia in Low country-specific migration cost
2010 2015 2020 Change 2010-2020 Relative inflowf
Austria 70,000e 80,646 104,346 34,346 0.4
Belgium 808 6,157 24,658 23,850 0.2
Denmark 485 6,202 24,953 24,468 0.4
Finland 275 4,999 22,873 22,598 0.4
France 17,185d 22,585 41,137 23,952 0.0
Germany 234,381 252,576 283,978 49,597 0.1
Greece 17,185d 21,323 38,608 21,423 0.2
Ireland 503 6,936 26,526 26,023 0.6
Italy 21,261 26,066 44,020 22,759 0.0
Netherlands 1,464 8,155 27,883 26,419 0.2
Portugal 82 1,953 16,960 16,878 0.2
Spain 1,727 4,775 21,006 19,279 0.0
Sweden 2,400 8,265 27,285 24,885 0.3
United Kingdom 17,185d 23,588 43,148 25,963 0.0
Total 263,386 474,225 747,382 362,441 0.1
Stock of Nationals from Croatia in Medium country-specific migration cost
2010 2015 2020 Change 2010-2020 Relative inflowf
Austria 70,000e 72,682 89,297 19,297 0.2
Belgium 808 −1,892 9,206 8,398 0.1
Denmark 485 −1,842 9,522 9,037 0.2
Finland 275 −3,061 7,372 7,097 0.1
France 17,185d 14,536 25,688 8,503 0.0
Germany 234,381 244,737 269,521 35,140 0.0
Greece 17,185d 13,254 23,062 5,877 0.1
Ireland 503 −1,096 11,158 10,655 0.2
Italy 21,261 18,007 28,526 7,265 0.0
Netherlands 1,464 126 12,527 11,063 0.1
Portugal 82 −6,154 1,239 1,157 0.0
Spain 1,727 −3,312 5,379 3,652 0.0
Sweden 2,400 224 11,873 9,473 0.1
United Kingdom 17,185d 15,556 27,778 10,593 0.0
Total 263,386 361,765 532,147 147,206 0.0
Stock of Nationals from Croatia in Medium country-specific migration cost
2010 2015 2020 Change 2010-2020 Relative inflowf
Austria 70,000e 67,098 78,337 8,337 0.1
Belgium 808 −7,536 −2,039 −2,847 0.0
Denmark 485 −7,482 −1,709 −2,194 0.0
Finland 275 −8,711 −3,908 −4,183 −0.1
France 17,185d 8,893 14,446 −2,739 0.0
Germany 234,381 239,239 258,983 24,602 0.0
Greece 17,185d 7,596 11,750 −5,435 0.0
Ireland 503 −6,727 −28 −531 0.0
Italy 21,261 12,358 17,251 −4,010 0.0
Fertig and Kahanec IZA Journal of Migration  (2015) 4:6 Page 18 of 27
Table 7 Predicted net-immigration from Croatia – Accession scenario (Continued)
Netherlands 1,464 −5,502 1,350 −114 0.0
Portugal 82 −11,837 −10,198 −10,280 −0.1
Spain 1,727 −8,981 −5,990 −7,717 0.0
Sweden 2,400 −5,414 656 −1,744 0.0
United Kingdom 17,185d 9,924 16,590 −595 0.0
Total 263,386 282,918 375,489 −9,452 0.0
dStock for 2010 imputed by mean of countries without missing information; eEstimate of stock for 2010 taken from
http://www.integrationsfonds.at/oeif_dossiers/kroatische_migrantinnen_in_oesterreich/. fAccumulated inflows relative to
the population in 2010 (in percent).
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term steady state.
The predictions for Ukraine are confronted with the results for Croatia. Forecasts for
the rest of the accession candidates are summarized at the end of this section. Table 5
summarizes the results of the (counterfactual) pre-accession scenario for Croatia, sug-
gesting that there will be net-immigration from Croatia to the different countries of the
EU-14, even in the case of closed borders and without accession. However, these in-
flows will be modest in size and will only total more than 1,000 persons per year for
Germany, Italy and Spain.
For the case of Ukraine, Table 6 suggests higher net-immigration in this scenario,
given that this sending country is larger in terms of population and less developed with
respect to income and employment. However, even for Ukraine, the absolute number
of expected migrants only exceeds 100,000 persons for Germany and Italy during the
ten years considered.
Compared to actual net-immigration from Croatia and Ukraine to Germany during
2000–2010, our model produces realistic results. The annual net-inflow from Croatia
to Germany in the first decade of the 21st century amounted to around 2,000 persons,
while the corresponding number for Ukraine was approximately 6,000 persons. Hence,
we slightly under-predict immigration from Croatia, whereas the opposite holds for the
case of Ukraine.
Tables 7 and 8 contain the forecasts derived from the accession scenario, with both
tables demonstrating that policy and sending country-specific migration costs matter
significantly. The importance of policy is demonstrated by the increase in net-
migration, especially after allowing free access (2015–2020) for migrant workers; indeed,
for some destinations, we even predict positive net-immigration only from Croatia
during this period. The importance of migration costs specific to various sending
countries is underscored by the variation of projections depending on the assumption about
migration costs. For example, forecasts for the case of Ukraine vary between 1.3 million
to almost 7 million under various scenarios.
Table 9 provides a summary of the results for the rest of the countries considered
(under the accession scenario medium migration costs post enlargement). From Table 9,
it becomes apparent that expected migration flows from these countries are rather
modest in size. In absolute numbers, the largest predictions occur for Serbia, Georgia
and Armenia, with a little more than 300,000 persons over the entire forecasting
period. For Belarus, which is relatively wealthy and exhibits no noteworthy stock of mi-
grants in the EU-14 in 2010, we predict positive net-immigration only to Austria,
Table 8 Predicted net-immigration from Ukraine – Accession scenario
Stock of Nationals from Ukraine in Low country-specific migration cost
2010 2015 2020 Change 2010-2020 Relative inflowf
Austria 14,136 187,876 520,859 506,722 6.0
Belgium 3,014 151,344 447,718 444,704 4.0
Denmark 6,072 161,426 466,910 460,838 8.3
Finland 1,983 142,178 426,384 424,401 7.9
France 17,381 164,933 460,144 442,764 0.7
Germany 137,527 376,543 808,559 671,032 0.8
Greece 55,109 213,350 524,550 469,441 4.2
Ireland 1,741 162,895 478,451 476,710 10.4
Italy 174,129 421,129 865,087 690,958 1.1
Netherlands 2,521 166,832 485,714 483,193 2.9
Portugal 52,423 192,510 476,556 424,133 4.0
Spain 81,718 255,710 590,944 509,226 1.1
Sweden 2,299 155,444 459,020 456,721 4.9
United Kingdom 24,229 189,076 510,155 485,926 0.8
Total 574,282 2,941,246 7,521,051 6,946,769 1.7
Stock of Nationals from Ukraine in Medium country-specific migration cost
2010 2015 2020 Change 2010-2020 Relative inflowf
Austria 14,136 89,884 293,488 279,352 3.3
Belgium 3,014 52,804 215,760 212,746 1.9
Denmark 6,072 63,034 236,110 230,038 4.1
Finland 1,983 43,460 192,908 190,925 3.6
France 17,381 66,376 228,041 210,660 0.3
Germany 137,527 279,980 593,520 455,993 0.6
Greece 55,109 115,026 294,441 239,332 2.1
Ireland 1,741 64,634 248,885 247,144 5.4
Italy 174,129 324,740 651,537 477,408 0.8
Netherlands 2,521 68,635 256,584 254,063 1.5
Portugal 52,423 93,790 243,060 190,637 1.8
Spain 81,718 157,737 363,842 282,124 0.6
Sweden 2,299 57,009 227,960 225,661 2.4
United Kingdom 24,229 90,896 281,279 257,049 0.4
Total 574,282 1,568,005 4,327,416 3,753,134 0.9
Stock of Nationals from Ukraine in High country-specific migration cost
2010 2015 2020 Change 2010-2020 Relative inflowf
Austria 14,136 20,540 117,643 103,506 1.2
Belgium 3,014 −16,923 36,468 33,454 0.3
Denmark 6,072 −6,590 57,686 51,614 0.9
Finland 1,983 −26,390 12,475 10,492 0.2
France 17,381 −3,363 48,639 31,259 0.0
Germany 137,527 211,631 426,941 289,414 0.4
Greece 55,109 45,450 116,538 61,429 0.5
Ireland 1,741 −4,898 71,390 69,649 1.5
Italy 174,129 256,513 486,077 311,948 0.5
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Table 9 Summary of forecasts for rest of EaP-countries, Macedonia, Montenegro and
Serbia
2010-2020: Predicted net-immigration from: To: Armenia Azerbaijan Belarus Georgia
Austria 26,346 15,904 6,640 27,507
Belgium 24,647 9,644 −227 24,777
Denmark 24,726 11,009 1,099 25,256
Finland 23,384 6,810 −3,366 23,414
France 23,160 5,873 −4,038 23,097
Germany 24,704 12,157 3,436 25,653
Greece 21,349 169 −10,109 20,589
Ireland 25,817 14,458 4,831 26,806
Italy 21,848 1,894 −7,150 21,530
Netherlands 26,070 15,174 5,587 27,114
Portugal 19,303 −6,063 −16,881 17,889
Spain 21,808 −973 −10,869 21,170
Sweden 24,924 11,804 1,764 25,487
United Kingdom 24,601 10,409 792 25,091
Total 332,687 108,269 −28,492 335,381
2010-2020: Predicted net-immigration from… to… Macedonia Moldova Montenegro Serbia
Austria 8,843 20,115 2,008 30,931
Belgium 7,205 17,058 1,626 23,912
Denmark 7,452 17,518 1,714 24,700
Finland 6,502 16,035 1,461 21,580
France 6,819 16,574 1,398 23,217
Germany 10,203 17,716 1,717 57,246
Greece 5,666 14,560 1,050 18,831
Ireland 8,044 18,841 1,927 30,067
Italy 10,254 23,743 1,171 20,353
Netherlands 8,210 18,990 1,967 27,899
Portugal 3,897 13,354 678 11,575
Spain 4,933 14,824 984 15,912
Sweden 7,504 17,676 1,747 25,959
United Kingdom 7,735 18,176 1,674 26,705
Total 103,267 245,180 21,122 358,887
Table 8 Predicted net-immigration from Ukraine – Accession scenario (Continued)
Netherlands 2,521 −852 79,417 76,896 0.5
Portugal 52,423 23,938 62,612 10,189 0.1
Spain 81,718 88,406 188,199 106,481 0.2
Sweden 2,299 −12,645 49,343 47,044 0.5
United Kingdom 24,229 21,420 104,301 80,072 0.1
Total 574,282 596,236 1,857,730 1,283,448 0.3
fAccumulated inflows relative to the population in 2010 (in percent).
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Fertig and Kahanec IZA Journal of Migration  (2015) 4:6 Page 22 of 27Denmark, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, Sweden and the UK. For the rest of the
destination countries, the model predicts no net-immigration13.
Figure 5 illustrates total annual inflows to the EU-14 from all countries under study
(except Belarus, due to the above-mentioned data problems and resulting negative
predictions). Extrapolating the status quo will result in total predicted inflows to the
EU-14 countries between 0.1 and 0.2 million migrants per year. Due to the positive
impact of the stock of migrants, these annual inflows display a slightly positive trend
over time. In the accession scenario, predicted inflows increase to almost 0.3 million
migrants per year during the assumed five year period of partial liberalization. After
2015, i.e., if we assume free access to the EU-14’s labor markets, annual inflows
amount to around 0.8 million persons per year, although the inflows are expected to
go down after the fourth year after liberalization, which is in line with the results
from our regression model. In both cases, the majority of them, of course, are
predicted to come from Ukraine. Hence, even in the unlikely event of simultaneously
liberalizing EU-14’s labor markets to all these countries, there is no reason to expect
overwhelming immigration.
Table 10 summarizes the predicted inflows by destination for all countries under
study, apart from Belarus. Accordingly, the predicted total net-immigration in absolute
terms is the highest for Germany, Italy and Austria. Under the accession scenario with
medium migration costs (post enlargement), Germany can expect slightly more than
0.6 million immigrants between 2010 and 2020, Italy slightly less than 0.6 million and
Austria around 0.4 million. Portugal and Finland are found at the other end of the
distribution.
However, Finland is among the main receiving countries if predicted inflows are re-
lated to the destination countries’ population in 2010, and it is predicted to experience
a population growth of around 5.5 percent due to these inflows, which is only exceeded
























Status quo (pre-accession scenario) Liberalization (accession scenario)
Figure 5 Total annual inflows to EU-14 for both scenarios.
Table 10 Predicted total net-immigration 2010–2020 by destination countries (Croatia,
Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and all EaP-countries, except Belarus)
Destination
country
















Note: Accession scenario with medium migration costs (post enlargement).
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destination country that is among the main receiving countries in both dimensions is
Austria. By contrast, Germany and Italy can expect relative net-inflows of only around
1 percent.6. Conclusions
The European Union’s eastern enlargement sparked heated debates in Europe during
the 2000s, which continue to date. The discourse revolves around issues such as the ef-
fects of migration on wages and employment, the propensity to take up or be attracted
by welfare benefits, or social dumping. Given that much of this debate has been politi-
cized, misinformed or based on outright myths, it is important to anchor it in sound
analysis based on hard data.
This paper provides an evaluation of the scale of east–west European mobility under
two key scenarios – the status quo and the liberalization of access to EU labor markets.
Moreover, it also informs the broader debate about the determinants of migration by
providing insights into the determinants of east–west migration in Europe following
the 2004 enlargement of the European Union.
Using longitudinal data on bilateral flows between the EU-8 and EU-14, we
estimate a robust prediction model that exhibits desirable properties. The key result
is that while migration costs and economic conditions matter for east–west post-
enlargement migration flows, policy variables explain a greater part of the observed
variation.
Informed by expert demographic and economic forecasts and assuming two arche-
typal policy scenarios, we provide out-of-sample projections of migration flows from
the Eastern Partnership countries, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia to the
EU15 minus Luxembourg. The predicted migration flows are generally modest,
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In fact, the predicted increase due to liberalization appears to be temporary, with the
predicted incremental migration flows generally subsiding after several years. Ukraine
will remain the country that sends the most migrants, mainly due to its size, while
Germany, Italy and Austria will be among the countries receiving the most migrants in
absolute terms. Overall, we predict that during 2010–2020, on average, 1.7 percent of
populations of the studied countries (except Belarus) will decide to try their fate in the
EU-15 minus Luxembourg under the status quo (pre-accession scenario), and 6.7
percent under liberalization (accession scenario). This implies that additional total
inflow from all these countries over 2010–2020 corresponds to around only 0.3 percent
of the receiving countries’ populations as of 2010 under the pre-accession scenario and
1.5 percent under the accession scenario.
From a policy perspective, a key result is that migration policy frameworks matter,
although the effect of liberalization of migrants’ access to receiving labor markets is
predicted to be temporary. A further implication is that a non-harmonized timing of
liberalization across the receiving countries, as was the case for prior eastern enlarge-
ments, may divert migration flows and concentrate them in some receiving countries
more than others. In this regard, our projections should be seen as indicators of the mi-
gration potential. In any case, based on a sound out-of-sample prediction, we conclude
that aggregate migration potential is modest and that fears of mass migration from the
EU’s Eastern neighbors and Croatia are unjustified.Endnotes
1This was preceded by two waves of EU eastern enlargement, the first in 2004 when
the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia
(along with Cyprus and Malta) and the second in 2007 when Bulgaria and Romania
joined the EU.
2Iceland and Turkey also obtained candidate status. Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina
are classified as potential candidates.
3EU-12 encompasses the following countries: Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany,
Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Italy and the UK.
4 A very similar picture emerges if we compare Germany, the Netherlands and the
UK with other Mediterranean countries like Greece or even Italy.
5See also Constant (2012).
6In quantitative terms, this exclusion is negligible since the stock of migrants from
the EU-8 living in Luxembourg amounts to merely 0.4 percent in 2009.
7Partial liberalization signifies liberalization of labor market access in specified sectors
or occupations, or a combination of them, typically based on job shortages.
8The findings of Elsner (2013a, 2013b) that out-migration increases domestic wages
implies that wages, and possibly unemployment rates as well, may be endogenous with
respect to their effects of out-migration. If outmigration positively affects income or de-
creases unemployment rates in sending countries, the true (negative) effects of home
income and employment rate variables on outmigration could be larger.
9Of course, the former Yugoslav countries look back on a common migration history
with some EU Member States for a rather long time. However, the policy regimes
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refugee migration) were completely different from what we are interested in this paper.
10For Croatia, these projections are valid under the (counterfactual) assumption of no
EU accession.
11The EU14 countries are divided into three groups according to their labor market
situation in 2010: (i) high employment countries: Austria, Denmark and the
Netherlands; (ii) medium employment countries: Belgium, Finland, France, Germany,
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Sweden and the United Kingdom; and (iii) low employ-
ment countries: Spain.
12For Belarus, the IMF reports an unemployment rate of 0.7% in 2010. Following the
advice of national experts, we assumed the unemployment rate of 10% in 2010 and
used the unemployment rate trends from Ukraine to generate forecasts for Belarus
until 2020.
13However, we suspect that the underlying GDP and employment figures for Belarus
might be biased upward. In such a case, our projections would be underestimated
Appendix
Table A.1. Definition of policy regimes for workers from EU-8
Table A.1 presents the definition of policy variables measuring immigration policy re-
gimes. Two policy dummies are distinguished: free movement and partial restrictions.
Free movement equals one if the respective country allowed immigrants from the new
member states to access the host country's labor market in the respective year, and zero
otherwise. The second policy dummy variable equals one if in a given country and year
only partial restriction on the inflow of workers to its labor market were applied, and zero
otherwise.Member state Pre-accession period Post-accession period
Austria Full restriction Full restriction
Belgium Full restriction Partial restrictions
Denmark Full restriction Partial restrictions
Finland Full restriction Free access since 2006
France Full restriction Free access since 2008
Germany Full restriction Partial restrictions
Greece Full restriction Free access since 2006
Ireland Full restriction Free access since 2004
Italy Full restriction Free access since 2006
Netherlands Full restriction Free access since 2007
Portugal Full restriction Free access since 2006
Spain Full restriction Free access since 2006
Sweden Full restriction Free access since 2004
United Kingdom Full restriction Free access since 2004European Commission (2008), Table 1, p. 111.
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